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  This paper reviews the use of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating homeland 
security regulations.  Until the recent use of "break-even analysis" by the Department of 
Homeland Security, analysis of regulations to reduce the risk of a terrorist attacks have 
been severely lacking.  The costs were likely to be understated particularly because the 
costs of restrictions on immigration and of the curbing of civil liberties are omitted.   
Benefits were often left uncalculated leaving it impossible to meaningfully evaluate the 
policies being promulgated.  The use of break-even analysis has improved the ability to 
evaluate homeland security policy.  However, DHS needs to provide this information in a 
more consistent format in order to allow comparison of regulatory initiatives.  DHS also 
needs to provide its own assessment of what the break-even analysis tells us about the 
likelihood that the benefits of their regulations outweigh their costs. 
 1 
Analysis of Homeland Security Regulations, Small Steps Forward,  





  Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the area of homeland security 
has gained a prominent role in government.  This is particularly true in the regulatory 
sphere where homeland security has joined environmental protection, food safety and 
other areas as a primary focus.  When social regulation gained prominence in the 1960s 
and 1970s, it prompted a reaction from anti-regulation forces that included the adoption 
of cost-benefit analysis as a means of assessing regulations (Conley). 
  The use of cost-benefit analysis has greatly increased our understanding of 
environmental policy and many other areas.  Homeland security rules creates unique 
challenges for cost-benefit analyses.  While there are numerous problems in calculating 
the costs of these regulations, the primary challenges are in measuring the benefits of 
homeland security rules.  Since much of the information required to assess the value of 
preventing terrorist attacks is not only highly uncertain but also classified, many rules on 
homeland security have escaped serious economic analysis. 
  In the past year however, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
utilized a new technique of analyzing their most costly regulations.  This use of "break 
even analysis" allows some comparison between costs between benefits.  Analysis of 
homeland security regulations however still has a long way to go before it is as detailed 
as analysis of other federal regulatory requirements.
1  This paper assesses the progress 
that has been made in evaluating homeland security rules and presents some ideas for 
improving these evaluations. 
  The most significant proposal that I present is the idea of analyzing "general 
security rules" or rules that are designed to reduce the likelihood of any attack differently 
from "specific security rules" or rules designed to prevent a specific type of attack.  In 
making this distinction, I introduce the concept of a replacement level attack.  Coupled 
                                                 
1 Independent commissions such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal 
Communications Commission are not required to conduct cost-benefit analyses of their regulatory 
requirements and do not do so. 2 
with break even analysis, this concept may allow us to better assess the benefits of 
homeland security regulations. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, I review the various bodies of 
academic literature that bears on assessing the costs and benefits of homeland security 
regulations.  I also review the break even analyses conducted recently by DHS.  In 
Section III I discuss the issues involved in evaluating the costs of homeland security 
rules.  I present the concept of general and specific security rules and the idea of a 
"replacement level attack" in the context of a broader discussion of the benefits of 
homeland security rules in Section IV.  I offer conclusions in Section V.  
 
II. Existing Work on the Benefits and Costs of Homeland Security 
 
  While there are not a large number of works that speak specifically to the question 
of cost-benefit analysis of homeland security policies, a number of different literatures 
provide information relevant to this problem.  A number of different economists and 
modelers have attempted to assess the costs of terrorist attacks, a key component of any 
cost-benefit analysis.  The edited volume The Economic Impacts of Terrorist Attacks 
(Richardson, Gordon, and Moore eds 2005) contains a number of these estimates 
including an estimate for the cost of bioterrorist attacks (Abt 2005), an estimate for the 
cost of an attack on Seattle’s highways (Bae, Blaine, and Bassok 2005) and the cost of an 
attack on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (Gordon et. al. 2005). 
 The  journal  Risk Analysis dedicated an issue to the costs of terrorism in June 
2007.  Several of the articles in this issue also gave estimates for the cost of terrorist 
attacks including an attack on the aviation system (Gordon et. al. 2007), an attack on the 
power system for Los Angeles (Rose, Oladosu, and Liao 2007) and another estimate of 
the cost of an attack on the LA and Long Beach ports.  Other attacks that have been 
estimated include several on the Washington DC area (Cheng, Stough,and Kocornik-




                                                 
2 In a related work, Abadie and Garbdeazabal (2003) discuss the effect of attacks in Basque country on 
stock prices and find that stocks do better during truces between the Basque separatists and the Spanish 
government. 3 
Table I Costs of Various Terrorist Attacks 
 
Author Attack  Cost  Estimate 
Gordon et. al.  Aviation System  $214-421 billion not 
counting lives 
Rose, Oladosu, Liao  L.A. Blackout  $2.8 -20.5 billion depending 
on resilience 
Rosoff and Winterfeldt  Dirty Bomb in LA/Long 
Beach ports 
$130 million- $100 billion 
depending on length of 
shutdown, lives lost 
expected to be zero 
Gordon et. al.  LA, Long Beach Ports  $1.1 billion/10,061 person 
years employment -- $34 
billion/212,000 person 
years of employment 
Cheng, Stough,and 
Kocornik-Minaand 
Power Plant Attack in DC  $1.18 billion 
Abt Bioterrorist  Attack  $200 billion -$3 trillion, 
deaths from 500,000 to 30 
million 
Bae, Blaine, Basso  Seattle Highways  $1.2-$1.5 billion 
 
 
  In addition, the private company, "Risk Management Solutions" has developed a 
model for use by insurance companies to measure the risk of terrorist attacks.  This model 
has been used by DHS to generate probabilities for various attacks which can then be fed 
into a cost-benefit analysis.  The model is available for private purchase but does not 
appear to have been subject to peer review and the assumptions that underlie the model 
are not obvious to the outside researcher.
3 
  Because one of the primary effects of a terrorist attack is loss of life, a fair 
evaluation of homeland security regulations will include an economic valuation of the 
probable lives lost in a terrorist attack.  Many of the above sources do not include the 
value of the statistical lives saved (or more accurately the value of the risk reduction to 
individuals) in their analysis.  A vast literature, developed to assess the benefits of other 
policies such as environmental protections, food safety requirements, and auto safety 
mandates, exists on methodologies for reducing risks and valuing the "statistical lives" 
saved by such policies (eg. Ashenfelter 2006 Sunstein 2003).   Agencies regularly use the 
                                                 
3 See http://www.rms.com/Terrorism/Solutions/ProbabilisticTerrorismModel.asp for more details. 4 
"value of a statistical life (VSL)" which varies from $1-$7 million in their assessments of 
the benefits of their regulations (OMB 2004).
4 
  Posner (2004), in his book Catastrophe, discusses ways of conducting benefit cost 
analysis when there is tremendous uncertainty.  While Posner focuses on cases of 
catastrophic risks, some of his suggestions, most notably "inverse cost-benefit analysis" 
are potentially applicable to homeland security questions.  In three recent regulations, 
DHS has utilized inverse benefit-cost analysis, renaming it, “break-even analysis.”  
  The first of these analyses appeared in the DHS proposed rule on the Western 
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which would require travelers U.S. citizens and 
travelers from other western hemisphere countries to present passports to enter the United 
States.  The direct costs of this rule were estimated as $360 million on an annualized 
basis.  DHS then used an RMS model for the entire costs of terrorist attacks to this 
country.  They varied the methodology for valuing lives saved and preventing injuries 
from terrorist attacks to come up with “critical risk reduction” values.  If the WHTI 
reduced risks by more than this amount, then the benefits of the rule would exceed the 
costs.  For example with a VSL of $6 million, the WHTI would need to reduce the 
baseline risk of a terrorist attack by 6.9% in order for the benefits of the WHTI to exceed 
its costs (DHS 2007a). 
  Another break-even analysis was conducted by DHS in its "Secure Flight" 
proposed rulemaking.  Under this rule, according to DHS,  
 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) would receive passenger and 
certain non-traveler information, conduct watch list matching against the No Fly 
and Selectee portions of the Federal Government's consolidated terrorist watch 
list, and transmit boarding pass printing instructions back to aircraft operators. 
 
In the analysis supporting this proposed rule, DHS assumed that the rule would prevent 
one attack similar to the 9-11 attacks over the next ten years.  They estimated that the 9-
11 attacks ranged in costs from $63.9 billion to $374.7 billion.  For each of these values 
DHS presented a break-even frontier, graphing the possible values of the baseline 
probability of such an attack vs. the possible values of how much the Secure Flight rule 
                                                 
4 Sunstein (2003) also discusses the role that fear plays in increasing the amount that people value the 
prevention of terrorist attacks and how this may lead to higher VSL numbers. 5 
would reduce the likelihood of an attack.  Points to the northeast of the frontier would 
mean that the benefits of the rule exceeded the costs and points to the southwest signify 
that the opposite was true (DHS 2007b). 
  Finally, in January of 2008, DHS issued a final "Real ID rule" which set 
minimum standard for state issued drivers licenses that also contained a break-even 
analysis.  While the final regulatory evaluation has not yet been made public, the 
evaluation on the proposed rule states also assumes that the rule will prevent one attack 
similar to the 9-11 attacks.  In order for the proposed rule to have positive net benefits, 
the rule would have to reduce the probability of such an attack between 0.7% and 3.6%.  
The rule also has other ancillary benefits according to DHS and taken together, these 
ancillary benefits and the reduction in risk of a terrorist attack, "justify the rule's 
economic costs." (DHS 2007c).  
  These recent break-even analyses are indeed steps forward for the analysis of 
homeland security regulations.  Before 2007, the myriad rules issued to reduce the 
likelihood of terrorist attacks had no information on the benefits of these rules making an 
economic assessment of the rules impossible.  While these three break-even analyses 
represent definite improvements on the previous lack of information, the discussion 
below will demonstrate that there is still much to be done to effectively assess homeland 
security rules. 
 
III. What are the costs of homeland security regulations? 
 
Every year, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports to Congress on 
the annual benefits and costs of regulations.  In the area of homeland security, OMB says 
that "Because the benefits of homeland security regulation are a function of the likelihood 
and severity of a hypothetical future terrorist attack, they are very difficult to forecast, 
quantify, and monetize." (OMB 2007 p13).  However OMB does keep track of the costs 
of a subset of homeland security regulations. 
This subset consists of those regulations that are "economically significant" under 
Executive Order 12866.  These regulations each have an impact on the economy of more 
than $100 million in at least one calendar year.  Since 2002, there have been ten such 6 
regulations.  Most of these have been issued by DHS but several have been issued by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to prevent bioterrorist attacks.   
These ten regulations have been estimated to"impose a total cost on the economy 
of between $2.2 billion to $4.1 billion a year." (OMB 2007 p. 13).  As the only known 
figure of the cost of homeland security regulation, it is tempting to use this as an estimate.  
However there are very compelling reasons to believe that it vastly understates the 
amount of resources the federal government is forcing private entities to devote to 
homeland security.  There are two reasons that this number is likely to be an 
understatement.  One reason is that OMB does not include all regulations in its estimate.  
The other reason is omissions in the calculations of the costs of individual regulations. 
The first reason that the $4.1 billion is likely an underestimate is that there have 
been far more than ten rules issued since 2002 that impact homeland security.  OMB has 
never estimated the cost of rules not deemed "economically significant" but has stated 
that the rules included in their totals, the "economically significant" rules, likely make up 
the bulk of regulatory costs.  However, Robert Hahn, in an examination of an EPA rule, 
has noted that even economically insignificant rules can have significant costs (Hahn 
2006). 
I have gone through the Unified Agenda from 2002-2007 to find how many other 
final regulations have been designed to reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks.
5 I have 
found that in addition to the 10 economically significant rules, 45 other final rules have 
been promulgated by agencies in response to the potential for terrorist attacks.  A list of 
these rules appears in Appendix 1. 
Many of these rules are not counted because the promulgating agency estimates 
that they cost less than $100 million per year.
6  Some rules are missing because they were 
issued after the time period covered by the latest OMB report.  In this latter category is 
included the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) for air and sea, which DHS 
estimates will cost $650 million/year and the Real ID rule mentioned above There are 
also numerous other rules that are required by statute but have not yet been finalized that 
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they plan on issuing over the next six months and all those that they have issued in the previous six months. 
6 Technically the rules should be counted if the benefits exceed $100 million in any given year as well but 
since benefits are never counted it is likely that some rules that should be in the OMB total are not 
included. 7 
will have very significant costs.  These were not included in Appendix I.  "Real ID" alone 
has present value costs of $17 billion, which translates to $2.3 billion/year. 
Adding the rules (issued by December 31, 2007) that were too recent to be 
included in the OMB estimate would add at least a billion dollars to the cost of homeland 
security regulation.  As for the rules that cost less than $100 million/year, even if they 
only cost $25 million/year each, their inclusion would add another billion dollars to the 
costs.  And there is good reason to think that for these rules in particular the costs may be 
large (perhaps even greater than the $100 million/year threshold). 
Of those rules with costs estimated as less than $100 million/year, many make it 
more difficult for immigrants to enter the United States.  Since there is no analysis on 
rules with costs below $100 million/year, it is impossible to ascertain whether the agency 
considered the broader effect on the economy of immigration rules.  Such rules may have 
large effects on sectors such as agriculture, which employ large numbers of immigrants.  
These indirect costs likely are much greater than the direct costs that agencies usually 
estimate in cost benefit analyses.  While they may not make the cost of any of these rules 
rise above $100 million, it is also unlikely that the rules have trivial costs. 
Some of the rules that are included in the OMB totals also restrict immigration but 
the analysis of the costs of these rules ignore the impacts of restricted immigration on the 
U.S. economy.  An entire literature exists on the costs and benefits of immigration to the 
United States (see for example Borjas 2005).  This literature is far too complex to discuss 
here but it is quite likely that measures to restrict immigration have important economic 
impacts. 
Many of the rules, both those counted by OMB, and those not counted, also 
restrict individual liberties and privacy.  While the rules may mention these costs, there is 
no attempt to quantify them.  Indeed, quantifying such costs would be a very difficult 
task.  However, such costs certainly exist, and their absence from the analyses justifying 
homeland security regulations, means that the costs presented by agencies are certainly 
lower than the true costs.  In fairness to DHS, the academic literature has only touched on 
this issue.  Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) have analyzed the tradeoff between civil 
liberties and the prevention of terrorism and noted that people are willing to trade off 
some liberties and convenience for increased safety. 8 
Therefore significant work needs to be done to better understand the costs of 
individual homeland security regulations.  Including the costs of restricting immigration 
to the United States and the costs of limits on privacy and civil liberties would drive up 
the costs of some homeland security rules.  The increase in the costs of such rules, 
particularly those issued by the immigration agencies could be significant enough to lead 
to serious questions about the wisdom of such regulations. 
In addition to affecting our judgment about  individual rules, the omissions in the 
cost calculations lead to the inevitable conclusion that the upper limit of the costs of 
homeland security regulations as stated by OMB to be $4.1 billion/year, it is likely to be 
much greater. Counting the recent rules which are not yet included in the OMB estimates, 
and the rules which cost less than $100 million/year individually, these costs are likely to 
be well above $10 billion/year and may be significantly higher.  
 
IV. What are the Benefits of Homeland Security Regulation? 
 
  Until 2007, even those regulations that thoroughly analyzed the costs of homeland 
security rules, gave very little attention to the benefits.  For example, the analysis for the 
recently promulgated Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for air and sea states, “. . . it 
is not possible to obtain a single value estimate that comprises the bundle of benefits 
derived from the regulation in question. . .” and “we are unable to quantitatively estimate 
the incremental reduction in the probability of a terrorist attack that will result from this 
rule.” (WHTI 2007).  This language was fairly typical for homeland security regulations 
that do have a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
  The benefits of homeland security regulation can be crudely stated as: 
 
  B   =   ( P a - Pb)C 
 
where:   B  = the benefits of the regulation 
 P a = the probability of an attack after the regulation 
 P b = the probability of an attack before the regulation 
  C  = the cost (in economic terms) of an attack 
 
The central problem of course is that there is no data on a central component of the 
benefits estimate, (Pa - Pb).  This information may be genuinely unknown or it may 9 
classified to a degree that not even the agency promulgating the regulation (or the 
economists conducting the analysis) are allowed to use it or make it part of a public 
analysis. 
  For five years after September 11, this led to a complete lack of analysis of 
benefits of homeland security regulations.  While the focus of this paper is to suggest 
areas needed for improvement in the analysis of homeland security rules, it would be 
remiss not to note that we have no idea about the economic wisdom of over fifty rules 
issued in the wake of 9-11.  At some point in the future, if we can improve the analysis of 
current rules, it would be wise to re-examine these older regulations and to compare their 
costs and benefits. 
  As discussed above, DHS has employed break-even analysis to evaluate the 
wisdom of the three recent policy changes.  Break-even analysis has the virtue of, in the 
absence of data on Pa and Pb, potentially providing a bound on the risk reduction 
necessary for benefits to exceed costs.  If a break-even analysis concludes that a 50% 
reduction in the likelihood of a terrorist attack is necessary for the policy to have greater 
benefits than costs, then the policy seems unlikely to be a good idea.  On the other hand, 
if such an analysis shows that only a 0.01% reduction is needed, then the policy is likely 
to have benefits that exceed its costs. 
  The recent break-even analyses conducted by DHS are a step forward but still 
leave many unanswered questions.  One difficulty in interpreting the break-even analyses 
conducted by DHS is the lack of consistency.  One analysis calculated various values for 
a "critical risk reduction probability" (the WHTI rule).  The Secure Flight rule presented a 
"break even frontier" which allowed both the underlying probability of an attack and the 
risk reduction to vary.  The proposed real ID rule gave a range of break-even 
probabilities.  This lack of consistency makes it hard for outsiders to evaluate and 
compare regulatory initiatives. 
  Furthermore, as described by Posner (2005), the main idea of break-even analysis 
is to allow some subjective evaluation of the policy in question.  In none of the break-
even analyses, does DHS draw any conclusion about the wisdom of the policy in 
question.  In the WHTI rule, critical risk reduction probabilities are presented without 
comment on whether the WHTI is likely to reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks by 10 
any amount close to these probabilities.  In Secure Flight, the reader is given no idea, 
whether we may be below or above the break-even frontier.  Without some type of 
normative judgment, the break-even analysis is an interesting academic exercise that does 
little to help make policy decisions. 
  Asking DHS to put precise values on risk reduction probabilities is probably 
unreasonable given security concerns and the likely public reaction (one can envision the 
headline, "DHS estimates attack to be 24% likely!!!").  Still, break-even analysis does not 
require this degree of precision.  DHS could plausibly make arguments that its 
regulations reduced risks by more than the critical probabilities or that it was on the 
correct side of the break-even frontier.  This would allow the public to evaluate DHS' 
arguments and more importantly evaluate the policies embodied in the regulations. 
  Of course in order to meaningfully use break-even analysis, one needs a 
reasonable value for C.  As discussed above, a number of academic studies however have 
estimated the costs of various types of attacks.  It is entirely possible that additional 
studies could be done to assess the costs of a greater variety of attacks.  Of the 
considerable gaps in the data, this appears to be one of the easier ones to correct. 
  On the other hand, there are additional problems with measuring the value of "C" 
that federal agencies have not even begun to consider.  Homeland security rules can be 
thought of as falling into two categories.  There are rules that are designed to prevent a 
specific type of attack.  Examples of rules in this category include FDA rules designed to 
protect the food supply
7 and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) rules 
designed to protect air travel.  There are other rules that are designed to make it harder for 
terrorists to conduct any type of attack.  Rules that make it harder to enter the United 
States are in this category. 
  The value of "C" for these two types of rules should be thought of differently.  
The first category of rules, which I will call "specific security rules" make a particular 
type of attack less likely but do not have much of an effect on the probability of some 
type of attack.  One must assume that rational terrorists will alter their behavior in the 
wake of new restrictions.  For example, protecting the food supply sends the signal to 
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terrorist organizations that they are better off spending their resources planning a 
different type of attack. 
  Therefore the value of "C" for a specific security rule should be the differential 
value between the benefit of preventing the specific attack (or reducing its likelihood) 
and the cost of a "replacement level" attack (the type of attack that a terrorist would turn 
to if their first choice attack was made too difficult).
8  In some cases where attacks are 
particularly deadly, the differential benefits between the specific attack and the 
replacement attack may be significant.  Protecting nuclear facilities or large chemical 
plants may very well fall into this category.  For other types of specific security rules, the 
benefits of the rule may be less than we imagine because the rule will only encourage the 
terrorist to look for a different venue (Smith and Hallstrom 2005). 
  On the other hand, rules, which I will call "general security rules," designed to 
make it harder for terrorists to enter this country, or to make it easier to apprehend 
terrorists, reduce the likelihood of all attacks.  Immigration rules fall in this category.  Of 
course, these rules may just encourage terrorists to attack our allies rather than the United 
States.  Benefit-cost analyses typically are concerned only with benefits and costs 
accruing to this country but we should keep in mind that for immigration rules, a global 
benefit-cost analysis would make some general security rules appear like specific security 
rules.  Indeed, one may argue that the tightened immigration rules issued since 9-11 have 
played a role in the numerous attacks in Europe since 2001. 
  Assessing the benefits of general security rules should be done differently than for 
specific security rules.  I would suggest that analysts for such rules assume a rational 
terrorist who will undertake the most destructive attack feasible.  The value of C for 
preventing such a terrorist from entering the country or of capturing such a terrorist 
would be the reduced probability of such an attack.  The economic cost of the 9-11 
attacks could serve as a reasonable proxy for "C". 
  In either case, specific or general security regulations, estimating C is likely to be 
feasible.  Estimates exist for the cost of the 9-11 attacks (Smith and Hallstrom 2005), 
which could be used as C for assessing the benefits of general security rules.  Specific 
                                                 
8 The idea of replacement level is used in analysis of the value of baseball players.  A given players true 
value is value minus the value of the player that would typically be used to replace him. (Kahrl 2007). 12 
security rules would be harder but as the literature cited above shows, estimates are 
possible.  The greater challenge will be estimating how regulations change the probability 
of an attack.   
  The recent break-even analyses conducted by DHS serve as instructive examples.  
The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative is what I would term "general security rules."  
The WHTI used a model by the company RMS to assess the average cost of a terrorist 
attack likely to occur over the next ten years.  This seems like a reasonable approach.  
The Secure Flight rule on the other hand is a specific security rule, protecting only 
against attacks using aircraft as weapons.  For C in this rule, DHS used the cost of the 9-
11 attacks.  I would maintain that this overstates the value of C, since if Secure Flight is 
likely to be successful, the result will not be a lack of terrorist attack, but rather a 
different (possibly less lethal) attack.  The cost of this replacement attack should be 
subtracted from the cost of the 9-11 attacks in order to come up with a meaningful value 
of C. 
  Finally attention should be given to the possibility of using information markets to 
better ascertain information on both the change in probability of an attack and the costs of 
a potential attack.  Hahn and Tetlock (2005) describe information markets and the 
possibility that they could be used by government decisionmakers to better evaluate 
parameters that are otherwise unknown.  Homeland security may be a particularly rich 
field for information markets since private actors may have significantly better 
information than government decisionmakers on the probability and consequences of 




  Over the past 25 years, cost-benefit analysis has become a permanent fixture in 
the regulatory process for many agencies.  One result of this is that we can say with 
considerable certainty that our efforts to clean up our environment (particularly reducing 
air pollution) have been a huge success (EPA 1997).  We can make no such statements 
about our efforts to make the country less likely to suffer a terrorist attack.  We have 
required private expenditures of billions of dollars to enhance homeland security.  Have 
these dollars been well spent?  We don't know. 13 
  Since September 11, 2001, at least 55 final rules have been issued to attempt to 
reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack.  Many of these rules have been issued without 
any data on their benefits or their costs.  Even those rules that are required to have a 
benefit-cost analysis conducted prior to their issuance have had virtually no information 
on the expected benefits of the policies they implement.  While few would question the 
need for policies to deter terrorist attacks, promulgating such policies in the absence of 
data on their impacts is a recipe for unwise decisionmaking. 
  While the lack of information on the benefits of homeland security regulations is 
the primary area of concern in evaluating these rules, there are also significant questions 
about the estimates of costs.  These questions include the lack of estimates of the costs of 
restrictions on immigration and the inability for agencies to quantify the sacrifices to 
privacy and civil liberties imposed by homeland security requirements.  Significant work 
is needed in both of these areas so that we can better understand the tradeoffs involved in 
improving homeland security. 
  The recent steps by DHS to introduce break-even analysis are laudable.  Such 
analysis allows the reader of these regulations to better evaluate their wisdom.  However, 
DHS needs to provide this information in a more consistent format in order to allow 
comparison of regulatory initiatives.  DHS also needs to provide its own assessment of 
what the break-even analysis tells us about the likelihood that the benefits of their 
regulations outweigh their costs. 
  This paper also highlights the distinction between specific and general homeland 
security measures and the need to analyze them differently.  The benefits of specific 
security measures are likely to be much smaller than those of general security measures.  
This distinction, coupled with the modes of analysis suggested above, may lead to a 
rethinking of homeland security policy.  If such a rethinking leads to a focus on the 
terrorist events with the greatest impacts, then the potential of benefit-cost analysis may 







Appendix I Homeland Security Rules Issued Since 9-11-01. 
 
Rules Included in the OMB Total Cost Estimate 
 
Rule Title  Department-Agency 
Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Registration of Food Facilities under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Prior Notice of Imported Food under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Required Advance Electronic Presentation of Cargo 
Information 
DHS-CBP 
Area Maritime Security  DHS-USCG 
Vessel Security  DHS-USCG 
Facility Security  DHS-USCG 
Authority To Collect Biometric Data From Additional 
Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly Trafficked 
Land Border Ports of Entry (US-VISIT) 
DHS-BTS 
Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Manifests 
for Vessels and Aircraft 
DHS-CBP 
Air Cargo Security Requirements  DHS-TSA 
 
Rules Not Included in the OMB Total Cost Estimate 
 
Rule Title  Agency 
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 
2002; Possession, Use and Transfer of 
Biological Agents and Toxins 
USDA- APHIS 
India and Pakistan: Lifting of Sanctions, 
Removal of Indian and Pakistani Entities, 
and Revision in License Review 
Commerce-BIS 
Possession, Use and Transfer of Select 
Agents and Toxins 
HHS-CDC 
Screening of Aliens and Other Designated 
Individuals Seeking Flight Training 
DOJ 
Attorney General's Evaluations of the 
Designations of Belgium, Italy, Portugal, 
and Uruguay as Participants under the Visa 
Waiver Program 
DOJ-INS 
Requirements for Biometric Border 
Crossing Identifications Cards (BCCs) and 
Elimination of Non-Biometric BCCs on 
DOJ-INS 15 
Mexican and Canadian Borders 
Authorizing Collection of Fee Levied on F, 
J, and M Nonimmigrant Classifications 
under Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act 
DOJ-INS 
Custody Procedures  DOJ-INS 
Review of Custody Determinations  DOJ-INS 
Requiring Change of Status from B to F-1 
or M-1 Nonimmigrant Prior to Pursuing a 
Course of Study 
DOJ-INS 
Release of Information Regarding INS 
Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities 
DOJ-INS 
Requiring Certification of All Service 
Approved Schools for Enrollment in the 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information 
System (SEVIS) 
DOJ-INS 
Passenger Data Elements for Visa Waiver 
Program 
DOJ-INS 
Reduced Courseload for Certain F and M 
Nonimmigrant Students in Border 
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National Security: Prevention of Acts of 
Violence and Terrorism 
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Protective Orders in Immigration 
Administrative Proceedings 
DOJ-EOIR 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information 
System (SEVIS) Rule -- 22 C.F.R. Part 62, 
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State 
Aviation Security Infrastructure Fees  DOT-TSA 
Civil Aviation Security Rules  DOT-TSA 
Security Programs for Aircraft With a 
Maximum Certificated Takeoff Weight of 
12,500 Pounds or More 
DOT-TSA 
Transportation of Explosives from Canada 
to the US Visa Commercial Motor Vehicle 
and Railroad Carrier 
DOT-TSA 
Aviation Security: Private Charter Security 
Rules 
DOT-TSA 
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Aviation Administration Certificate 
DOT-TSA 
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and Flights Rules 
DOT-FAA 
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DOT-FAA 
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Ineligibility for an Airman Certificate 
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DOT-FAA 
Limitation on Construction or Alteration in 
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Driver's Licenses with a Hazardous 
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U.S. Locations Requirement for 
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DOT-FRA 
Hazardous Materials: Security 
Requirements for Offerors and 
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DOT-RSPA 
Administrative Detention of Food for 
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Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
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DOT-FAA 
Retention and Reporting of Information for 
F, J, and M Nonimmigrants; SEVIS 
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Requirements 
DHS-USCG 
Threat Assessments Regarding Alien 
Holders of, and Applicants for, FAA 
Certificates 
DHS-TSA 17 
Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential (TWIC) Implementation in the 
Maritime Sector; Hazardous Materials 
Endorsement for a Commercial Driver’s 
License 
DHS-USCG 
Hazmat Fee Rule: Fees for Security Threat 
Assessments on Hazmat Drivers 
DHS-TSA 
Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports; 
Certain Dangerous Cargoes; Electronic 
Submission 
DHS-USCG 
Regulations Implementing the Support 
Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002 
DHS 
Documents Required for Travelers 
Departing From or Arriving in the United 
States at Air Ports-of-Entry From Within 
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